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Cramton: Counseling Organizational Clients"Within the Bounds of the Law"

COUNSELING ORGANIZATIONAL CLIENTS
"WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW"
Roger C. Cramton*

I.

THE COUNSELING FUNCTION

The principal function of lawyers is to communicate the lawyer's
knowledge of law to the client and apply it to the client's situation. Thus,
every lawyer who has clients, whatever else they do, is a counselor. Two
professional rules deal directly with counseling: Model Rule 1.2 deals
with scope of representation, allocation of authority between lawyer and
client, and prohibits a lawyer from counseling a client "to engage, or
assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent. ... " Model Rule 2.1 requires a lawyer to "render candid
advice" in the exercise of the lawyer's "independent professional
judgment.",2 That means, I believe, that the lawyer should level with the
client by communicating the law in all its sometimes certainty and often
ambiguity to the client, thus helping the client to act in a way that is
most likely to achieve the client's objectives; in short, to help the client
understand the law as it is and how it provides for or restricts the client's
options for action.
There is a vast literature on counseling techniques.3 Some years
ago, a somewhat paternalistic model was prevalent: the lawyer, because
of his knowledge of law and experience, took a dominant role in the
relationship. More recently, many lawyers urged and adopted a more
client-centered mode of counseling in which the lawyer acts as a friend
would, by listening to the client and leaving the major decisions to the
* Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law Emeritus, Cornell Law School. This paper was
prepared for the Hofstra Law School 2005 Legal Ethics Conference, October 30-November 1, 2005.
1. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2004).
2. Id.atR.2.1.
3. For a short summary of "the law and ethics of negotiation," with references to the
literature, see GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., SUSAN P. KONIAK, ROGER C. CRAMTON, & GEORGE M.
COHEN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 737-53 (4th ed. 2005).
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client.4 The actual practice of counseling, of course, is enormously
influenced by the nature of the client, the type of legal problem, and
whether the representation is an initial consultation or part of a
continuing lawyer-client relationship.
I will discuss a much narrower topic, but one which has been the
center of much professional discussion and controversy over the last
half-century: the duty of a lawyer for a business client to channel the5
client's conduct along a path that is "within the bounds of the law.",
This gives rise, of course, to the related question as to whether the
lawyer, who learns that the client is using or has used his services to
violate the law, may or must disclose client confidences to prevent or
rectify the harm to third persons flowing from the client's wrongful act.

II. THE LAWYER'S ROLE IN PREVENTING CORPORATE FRAUD
Consider the following simple fact situation: Lawyer L has
represented C Corp. for several years as its general outside counsel.
C Corp. is a closely-held corporation in which most of the stock is held
by C, the principal shareholder and CEO. The board of directors is
composed largely of C's family and friends, but a portion of the stock is
publicly traded. The relationship has produced substantial fees for L's
firm, but L has found C to be a difficult and demanding CEO. L
discovers in the course of representation that the company has altered
consumer transaction documents originally drafted by L in a way that
defrauds consumers by a small amount in numerous repetitious
transactions. Total fraudulent gains amount to millions of dollars.
L prepares a lengthy legal opinion supporting his belief that the
change involved is fraudulent and exposes the company to regulatory
penalties, shareholder and consumer actions to recover damages, and
adverse publicity. When L meets with the CEO, he argues that the
practice should be stopped and rebates offered on future purchases. The
CEO rejects this advice and suggests that if L cannot live with the
problem, he should resign. What may or must L do?

4. See, e.g., Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Crime, Confession, and the Counselor-at-Law:
Confessions from Dostoyevsky, 35 Hous. L. REv. 327 (1998); Robert D. Dinerstein, ClientCentered Counseling:Reappraisaland Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501 (1990).
5. A more extensive discussion of this topic is contained in Roger C. Cramton, Legal and
Ethical Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REV. 725, 809 (2004) [hereinafter
Cramton, Sarbanes-Oxley], and Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the CorporateLawyer: A Primer on
Legal and Ethical Issues, 58 BUS. LAW 143 (2002) [hereinafter Cramton, Enron and the Corporate
Lawyer].
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The situation should be considered in four stages. First, who is the
client? Second, must the lawyer climb the corporate ladder to ascertain
the views of the client? Third, if the highest authority of the organization
refuses to stop or rectify the criminal fraud, may or must the lawyer
blow the whistle? Fourth and finally, may or must the lawyer withdraw?
Only the first question has an easy answer. The lawyer's client is
the organization and not the CEO or principal shareholder. Although the
CEO retained L, directs his work and can fire him, L's client is the
corporate entity, C Corp. And the position of C Corp. on the matter at
issue has not been determined.
Must the lawyer climb the corporate ladder to ascertain the views of
the client? From 1983 until the amendments to Model Rule 1.13 in
August 2003, the ABA's position on this issue was muddied; it
combined an apparent requirement that the lawyer act in the best interest
of the entity with language that suggested caution, emphasized the
importance of confidentiality, and listed three measures, "among
others," that the lawyer might take: asking for reconsideration, advising
that a separate legal opinion be sought, and taking the matter to a higher
authority in the corporation.6 Some lawyers read the concern about
revealing confidential information outside the organization and the nonexclusive list of options as allowing the lawyer to do nothing. I believe
that response was wrong and my view is supported by a few judicial
decisions holding lawyers civilly liable for assisting a corporate fraud
when they failed to take the matter to higher authority on the ground that
it would have been futile to do so. 7 But it is fair to say that Model Rule
1.13 was something of a mess until 2003.
The 2003 amendment to Model Rule 1.13(b) emphasized the
lawyer's duty to act in the best interests of the organization, rather than
the interests of its constituents.8 The amendment eliminated the
6. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (1983).

7. See, FDIC v. O'Melvey & Myers, 969 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd and remanded on
other grounds, 512 U.S. 79 (1994), reaff'd on remand, 61 F.3d 17 (9th Cir. 1995) (a complaint
alleging that a law firm acted unlawfully in assisting a bank to defraud third persons stated a claim
for relief when the firm knew that the bank's auditor and lawyer had recently resigned and the bank
failed to make further inquiry; under these circumstances, a "reasonable, independent investigation"
of the client's financial status was required before giving legal opinions and assisting the bank in
soliciting investors); FDIC v. Clark, 978 F.2d 1541 (10th Cir.1992) (a bank's outside counsel was
subject to liability when the lawyers received plausible allegations that the bank's president had
defrauded the bank and, relying solely on the president's claim of innocence, failed to inquire
further or inform the board of directors of the allegations).
8. For discussion of the 2003 amendments, see Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The ABA Task
Force on Corporate Responsibility and the 2003 Changes to the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 35 (2003).
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discussion of relevant factors and the listing of three actions that "may"
be taken. More importantly, the text made it clear that referring the
matter to a higher authority was required unless the lawyer "reasonably
believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization to
do so. . . ,9 Despite the double negative, this is a requirement that the

lawyer must proceed up the ladder if that is in the best interest of the
organization.
The ABA was not acting on its own in stiffening the up-the-ladder
reporting of prospective or ongoing law violations. 10 Shortly before the
ABA acted, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 required the SEC to
promulgate rules of professional conduct to govern lawyers who appear
and practice before the Commission on behalf of issuers.1 As a lawyer
for a public company issuing securities, L would be subject to the SEC's
up-the-ladder reporting requirement. 12 The SEC rule requires L to report
the legal violation to the chief legal officer or CEO of C Corp. and, if an
appropriate response is not made in a reasonable period of time, to report
the violation to the board of directors or an appropriate committee of the
board.
In effect, both Model Rule 1.13(b) and the SEC rule require the
lawyer to take steps that will determine the action the corporate entity
really wants to take. The organization has internal remedies; it can take
steps to countermand the officer whose conduct threatens or entails harm
to the corporation. If those steps remedy the problem, the lawyer need
not take any further action. Confidentiality is preserved and the
company, especially in a prospective action situation, suffers no ill
consequences.
Reporting up the corporate ladder to the highest authority almost
invariably should lead to the termination of a material violation of law.
The fundamental obligation of officers and board members is to act in
the best interest of the corporate entity. 13 If the corporation has a serious

9. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2004).
10. See Cramton, Sarbanes-Oxley,supra note 5, at 737-40.
11. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 306, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). For useful
discussions of the background circumstances, see John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A
Capsule Social andEconomic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 269 (2004), and Susan P.
Koniak, When the Hurlyburly'sDone: The Bar's Struggle with the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1236,
1239-43 (2003).
12. See Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Rule, 17 C.F.R. pt. 205 (2006)
[hereinafter SEC Final Rule] (providing disclosure and withdrawal standards for securities lawyers
practicing before the SEC).
13. This established principle of corporate law is restated in the text of Model Rule 1.13(a):
"A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its
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legal problem, and the officer in charge refuses to act or is implicated in
the potential or actual illegality, the lawyer must act to protect the entity.
That can only be done by going up the corporate ladder to the ultimate
authority.
The merit of this approach flows from its effectiveness in curing the
problem without harming the corporation by harmful external publicity.
The action is effective because, if a clear illegality is involved, board
members have no option other than to restrain the officer whose conduct
is threatening harm. Under what circumstances would board members so
directly flaunt the law? They would be subject to personal liability if
14
they failed to take prudent steps to prevent or rectify the law violation.
And the result is achieved by internal action without harmful outside
publicity. Thus a stiff reporting-up requirement is the step likely to have
the largest effect on the reduction of corporate fraud and illegality. That
is why the SEC has made it the cornerstone of its corporate governance
steps relating to lawyers.
But suppose a rare case: The board, C Corp.'s highest authority,
flaunts the law and refuses to take appropriate remedial action. May or
must the lawyer disclose the confidential information to prevent harm to
the corporation and third persons? The SEC rule requires lawyers who
appear and practice before the SEC in the representation of issuers to
report evidence of a material violation of law or breach of fiduciary duty
by the issuer or its agent to its chief legal counsel or CEO. I5 If the chief
legal officer or CEO fails to provide "an appropriate response" to the
to an appropriate
evidence, the lawyer must report the evidence
16
board.
full
the
to
or
board
the
committee of
The 2003 ABA amendment provides for permissive disclosure
17
when the highest authority fails to address a violation of law.
Disclosure outside the client organization may be made on two
conditions. First, the company's highest authority refuses to address a
"clear" violation of law.' 8 And second, "the lawyer reasonably believes
duly authorized constituents." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1. 13(a) (2004); see also id. at

cmts. 1-3 (describing the principle in more detail).
14. For a discussion of the civil liability of corporate officers for actions harmful to the
organization or third persons, see Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer, supra note 5, at 14558, 167-73.
15. SEC Final Rule, supra note 12, § 205.3(b).
16. Id. § 205.3(b)(3).
17. For a comparison of ABA Model Rule 1.13 prior to August 2003 with the amendment of
that date, see THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 2005 SELECTED STANDARDS ON
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 54-60 (2005) (reprinting Rule 1.13 as amended in August 2003 in
the text with an accompanying footnote containing the prior version of the rule).
18. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a)(1) (2004).
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that the violation is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to
the organization. ' 9
In the hypothetical posed, these requirements are met. My
background assumption is that a state or federal regulatory law clearly
prohibits the billing practice that the company has included in its
consumer sales. The violation of law need not be criminal, although
probably the intentional inclusion of illegal charges would constitute
criminal as well as civil fraud. The second requirement is also met
because the billing practice results in a large total loss by consumers and
threatens the company with even greater harm if the public learns of its
criminal or fraudulent conduct. The permissible disclosure under Model
Rule 1.13(c) can be made "whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such
disclosure, but only if and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organization."2 ° And
disclosure is the only way to prevent the injury.
The fourth and final issue, unlike the changing and divided views
on outside disclosure of confidential information, has never changed
over the years. A lawyer is required to "withdraw from the
representation of a client if ...[continued] representation will result in
violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law.' ' 21 If the client
is engaged in a criminal or fraudulent course of conduct, continued
representation is likely to further or assist the client in perpetrating the
fraud. This violates Model Rule 1.2(d), which prohibits a lawyer from
counseling or assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer knows is
criminal or fraudulent.2 2 Thus, withdrawal is required in the hypothetical
I have been discussing once the client persists in the illegal practice after
the highest authority of the client fails to stop or remedy the illegal
conduct.
Monroe Freedman, one of the leading figures in the field of
American legal ethics, states very different views in his treatise and in a
recent article entitled, "The 'Corporate Watch Dogs' That Can't Bark:
How the New ABA Ethical Rules Protect Corporate Fraud. 23 He
describes the 2003 amendment as "a drafting and public-relations scam
that has persuaded the public and commentators that corporate lawyers

19. Id.atR. 1.13(c)(2).
20. ld atR. 1.13(c).
21. Id.atR. 1.16(a)-(a)(1).
22. Id.at R. 1.2(d).
23. Monroe H. Freedman, The "Corporate Watch Dogs " That Can'tBark: How the New ABA
EthicalRules ProtectCorporateFraud,8 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 225 (2004).
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are now permitted to report their clients' frauds. 2 4 But, he argues, the
them "corporate watchdogs" because they "are
new rule does not make
25
forbidden to bark.,

Freedman, discussing a situation very much like my hypothetical,
states that the lawyer for C Corp. cannot seek to rectify or mitigate the
fraud by means of a disclosure under Model Rule 1.13(c) for three
reasons. First, the board's failure to take remedial action is not "clearly"
criminal. Second, the board's failure to act is not "certain" to cause
"substantial injury to the organization" because it is unlikely that the
fraud will ever be discovered by anyone. And, third, for the same reason,
reporting out 26is not "necessary" to prevent "substantial injury to the
organization.,

The first argument, that "the board's failure to [take appropriate
remedial action] is not clearly criminal, 2 7 contains two errors. One is
that the conduct in question need not be a crime. Model Rule 1.13
applies to any action, or refusal to act, by a corporate officer or
employee that breaches a fiduciary duty the person owes to the
corporation or that "reasonably might be imputed to the organization. ''2 8
Many, perhaps most, of those "violations of law" will be civil rather than
criminal in character, such as breaches of tort or regulatory law that
carry civil penalties. Freedman also errs in stating that the rule turns on
whether or not the board's failure to take action is or is not a violation of
law. The decisive consideration is the board's failure to take action to
prevent or remedy the original violation of law.
Freedman's second argument, that "the board's failure to take
remedial action is not 'reasonably certain' to injure the company
substantially" 29 because, he states, "the fraud is not likely to be detected,
so there is not likely to be substantial injury to the corporation if the
lawyer remains silent. Accordingly, [Freedman concludes] the lawyer is
forbidden to go up the ladder.",30 In the language of the rule, the question
is whether, in the hypothetical posed, "the lawyer reasonably believes
that the violation is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to
the organization., 31 The objection that no injury has occurred until the
victims or the world know about it clearly has no application to an
24.

Id. at 225.

25. Id.
26. Id. at 227-28 (emphasis omitted).
27. Id. at 231.
28.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (1983).

29. Freedman, supra note 23, at 230 (emphasis added).
30. Id.at 229.
31.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(c)(2) (2004).
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officer's breach of a fiduciary duty to the corporation. When an officer is
filling his own pockets at the expense of the company, the corporation
suffers an immediate harm. With respect to imputed violations of law, in
which the corporation or third persons are harmed, Freedman argues that
a lawyer may or must conclude that there is no "substantial injury to the
organization" unless the constituent's crime, fraud or other violation is
likely to become generally known.32
I tested Freedman's argument, which is an extreme version of legal
realism, by posing his hypothetical to three individuals who were major
participants in the drafting and adoption of the 2003 version of Model
Rule 1.13. They each agreed that a lawyer may reasonably believe that a
"substantial injury" is "reasonably certain" when a company has
embarked on a course of conduct that involves stealing large amounts of
money from its customers. The conduct is clearly a violation of law, it is
substantial in character and one cannot blithely assume that the harm to
the organization will never materialize because the fraud will not be
discovered.
Truth and morality are important parts of our law and play large
roles in its interpretation; they are not values that should be assumed not
to exist in interpreting law. And, if that is not enough to determine the
meaning of "reasonably certain" and "substantial injury," it can be
argued that the likelihood of exposure meets both requirements. Auditors
may uncover the fraud at any time and they have a legal duty to report
legal violations publicly. Regulators may respond to consumer
complaints. Or a stubborn customer may stumble on the charge and
pursue it even though the amount is small. It should not be assumed in
our open society that chicanery can be concealed forever. And it
certainly should not be assumed that lawyers will participate in the
coverup. Freedman's argument, in essence, rests on an assumption that
business corporations will defraud, corporate lawyers will assist them in
doing so, and regulators, consumers and the public will pay no attention.
Freedman's third and final argument is a repetition of the second
one, already considered. The last clause of Model Rule 1.13(c) permits
disclosure, "but only if and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organization., 33 Here the
emphasis is on whether the disclosure is "necessary" to prevent the
"substantial injury." My argument in response would repeat much of
what I have already said.

32. See Freedman, supra note 23, at 232.
33.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(c) (2004).
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I agree with Freedman's criticism in one respect. The language
used in the revision of Model Rule 1.13 creates unnecessary interpretive
problems and, as Freedman states, never mentions the public interest in
protecting investors and other third persons from injury. The language of
the SEC rule permitting disclosure after the reporting-up requirements
have proved unsuccessful is much simpler, clearer and better: it speaks
of a lawyer revealing information to prevent or rectify "the
[organization] from committing a material violation that is likely to
cause substantial injury to the financial interest or property of the issuer
or investors. 34 Model Rule 1.13 would be improved by eliminating the
ambiguities of "clearly," "certain" and "necessary"--restrictive terms
that create unnecessary interpretive problems.
One other aspect of Freedman's interpretation of Model Rule 1.13
is worth mention. In addition to misreading the text of the rule, he totally
ignores the official comments to the rule, which directly contradict his
assertions and conclusions, and almost totally ignores the context that
gave rise to the rule, the explanations of it provided by the ABA, and the
interpretive comments of others concerning it. 35 His apparent
background view that businesses will defraud, the lawyers who represent
them will assist in the fraud, and everyone else will pay no attention
leads him to read the rule's language so that it fits his preconceptions.
The relationship between Model Rule 1.13 and other rules is not
mentioned by Freedman but is an important and neglected issue. The
addition of permissive disclosure under the rule, often referred to as
"reporting out," is not the only provision of state ethics rules that permit
or require disclosure. Those provisions supplement Model Rule 1.13 and
are not replaced by it. This is made clear by the history and language of
that it applies
the two rules. For example, Rule 1.13(c) states explicitly
36
"whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure."
Thus, the rule generally governing exceptions to confidentiality is
an alternative source of law permitting or requiring a lawyer to disclose
confidential information to prevent, mitigate or rectify a prospective or
ongoing client crime or fraud. And state ethics rules, today and formerly,
have more and broader exceptions to confidentiality than are found in
the Model Rules. For example, even in its broadened 2003 form, Model
34. SEC Final Rule, supra note 12, § 205.3(d)(2)(i).
35. The societal concern in the years following the Enron collapse that accountants and
lawyers were assisting company officials by conduct prejudicial to the interests of the corporate
entity is discussed in the Coffee article, supra note 11. The bar's reaction to that concern is
discussed in the Hamermesh article, supranote 8.
36.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(c) (2004).
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Rule 1.6 does not permit disclosure of a client's intention to commit a
crime. 37 Thirty of the fifty-one United States jurisdictions either permit
or require such disclosure. 38 And forty-four states require, and three
more permit, disclosure of a client's ongoing crime or fraud, which was
allowed under the Model Rules prior to 2003 only pursuant to a
comment providing for "noisy withdrawal. 39
But there is more. A third and much neglected rule, Model Rule
4.1(b), requires a lawyer "to disclose a material fact when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client,
unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.,,4o Assume that L has gone
up the corporate ladder and the client, C Corp., intends to defraud new
customers by imposing a criminal or fraudulent charge. Also assume that
some of the documents employed in these continuing transactions were
prepared by lawyer L. Any continued representation by L will assist the
client's wrongdoing. Once L learns of the ongoing fraud, L must take
further steps to avoid assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer knows
is criminal or fraudulent, which is a violation of Model Rule 1.2(d). And
that same knowledge triggers the obligation to disclose material facts
'
"unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.'AI
Comment 3 to Model Rule 4.1(b) addresses the situation when a
client's crime or fraud takes the form of a lie or misrepresentation:
Ordinarily, a lawyer can avoid assisting a client's crime or fraud by
withdrawing from the representation. Sometimes it may be necessary
for the lawyer to give notice of the fact of withdrawal and to disaffirm
an opinion, document, affirmation or the like. In extreme cases,
substantive law may require a lawyer to disclose information relating
to the representation to avoid being deemed to have assisted the
client's crime or fraud. If the lawyer can avoid assisting a client's
crime or fraud only by disclosing this information, then under [Model
Rule 4.1(b)] the lawyer is required to do so, unless the disclosure is
prohibited by Rule 1.6.42

As we have seen, the current Model Rule 1.6(b)(2)-(3) permits
disclosure to prevent or rectify a crime or fraud in which the lawyer's

37. Id. at R. 1.6.
38.

See ATT'Ys' LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC'Y, INC., Ethics Rules on Client Confidences, in

MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 17, at 144, 146-49 col. A (tabulating the current law of all U.S.
jurisdictions on disclosure of confidential information to prevent harm to third persons).
39. Id.at 146-49 col. G.
40. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1(b) (2004).
41.

Id.

42. Id. at cmt. 3.
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services have been used.43 Model Rule 4.1(b) turns that permission into a
requirement when the lawyer's work is involved in a client's prospective
or ongoing fraud. Thus, an analysis by the Attorneys' Liability
Assurance Society-the malpractice insurer of many large U.S. law
firms-concludes that forty-four state jurisdictions require disclosure in
this situation, two others permit it, and the remaining states require the
lawyer to resign, which L must do anyway after all internal remedies
have been exhausted and the lawyer's remonstrations have failed."
Model Rule 4. 1(b) has the important effect of making it clear that
silent withdrawal in some situations will not suffice. The client plans to
continue to use the lawyer's work to defraud others. When the
misconduct becomes known, as it probably will, the lawyer's failure to
act after acquiring full knowledge of the client's ongoing criminal
conduct gives rise to a civil liability suit against L. The suit is likely to
damage L's reputation and expose him and his firm to great expense.
Have the three rules I have discussed, Model Rules 1.13, 1.6 and
4.1, actually had the effect of shaping lawyer behavior? I think the SEC
gave a strong boost to the absolutely essential requirement that the
lawyer go up the corporate ladder. At least with publicly traded
companies, a lawyer can no longer treat the principal manager as the
client and ignore the interests of the entity and its shareholders. And the
rules surely trigger a lot of silent withdrawal. But lawyer participation in
hundreds if not thousands of major corporate frauds over the years gives
rise to some justifiable skepticism about whether these rules actually
control the behavior of business lawyers.
We do know several things. Except for the most egregious
instances of knowingly assisting a client's criminal or fraudulent
conduct, lawyers are never disciplined for failing to go up the ladder, for
not withdrawing when they should, or for not disclosing a prospective or
ongoing fraud even when the failure to do so assisted the client's
wrongdoing. The only remedies come in the form of civil liability suits
by those harmed or a very occasional criminal prosecution in an
egregious case. But those remedies have considerable bite. Typical
malpractice arrangements provide for a large deductible (perhaps $1
million in the case of a large law firm) and require the firm to bear the
expense of the litigation. So potential losses are large and worrisome,

43.

Id at R. 1.6(b)(2)-(3).

44.

See ATT'YS' LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC'Y, INC., Ethics Rules on Client Confidences, in

MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supranote 17, at 144, 146-49 (2004).
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and loss prevention activity on the part of law firms tries to prevent such
claims from arising.45
But the decentralized structure of many firms today, and
compensation policies that make partner earnings dependent on fees
earned, work in the other direction. The firm wants to prevent C Corp.
from exposing it to a major damage claim; but C Corp.'s fees may be a
large portion of lawyer L's earnings for the firm. In short, law firms
encounter an agency problem that is difficult to deal with and often
limits the action taken to a silent withdrawal at a very late stage.
III.

SOME UNSOLICITED ADVICE

I conclude with some unsolicited words of advice culled from my
study of corporate fraud situations over the years:
First, make sure that the board of directors, or an appropriate
committee of the board containing independent directors, signs off on
major matters that involve substantial legal risk after being fully
informed of those risks. Always bear in mind that your client is the
corporate entity and not the managers who provide direction on a dayby-day basis. All corporate frauds start with lawyers treating senior
management as the client and failing to communicate with higher
authority within management, or if management is the problem, to the
board of directors, who are the ultimate authority on all matters except
those on which shareholders must act. It is natural for you to defer to the
interests and desires of the managers who hired you, direct your work
and can fire you. But when facts arise that suggest a substantial legal
problem, such as a material violation of law by a division manager or a
self-dealing arrangement proposed by a dominant manager, you must be
sure that higher authority within the corporation is informed of the
situation, has taken appropriate steps to evaluate it and, if necessary, acts
to prevent or rectify any wrongdoing.
Second, in shaping future business transactions for a corporate
client, try to work only for clients who want a legal advisor who will
chart a prudent course through the shoals of the law. Beware of
corporate managers who push you to be "creative and aggressive" in
exploring the limits of the law. The business lawyer is a counselor and
advisor, not a litigator, and the goal is a sound result that will advance
the interests of the client "within the bounds of the law." Wise
counseling involves a prudent awareness of the existence of legal risk
45. See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., How to Cut the Cost of Malpractice, NAT'L L.J.,
Dec. 17, 1990, at 15-16.
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and not an effort in every situation to test how far the envelope of the
law may be pushed. Lawyers who take the latter approach run a grave
risk of assisting illegal conduct. If you cast prudence aside and take large
legal risks, your work may become the subject of public litigation under
very adverse conditions: Jurors don't like lawyers or corporate managers
and the "hindsight bias" will operate against you. If the transaction has
harmed third parties and appears to be fraudulent or illegal, your claim
that you did not "know" what the managers were really doing will fall
on deaf ears.
Third, do not assume the attorney-client or work-product immunity
privileges will protect legal files or lawyer-client communications. Any
transaction can go sour and, if it does, it is likely to be subject to afterthe-fact scrutiny. If the SEC or a state or federal prosecutor begins an
inquiry, the corporation is likely to "cooperate" with the inquiry. Large
corporate frauds almost invariably result in change of control and often
in bankruptcy; successors in interest will waive the confidentiality in an
effort to recover assets from the managers who looted the enterprise and
the lawyers and accountants who assisted them. Even in the cases when
waiver does not occur, the fraud victims probably will be successful in
using the crime-fraud exception to penetrate the privilege.
Fourth, you will not avoid civil liability by portraying your job as a
lawyer narrowly and attempting to place the blame on others. Lawyers
involved in client fraud situations almost invariably assert that agents of
the client lied to them, they did not know of facts indicating fraud, and
they reasonably relied on the decisions of officers and directors of the
company on business decisions and on the judgments of eminent
accountants on all accounting-related matters. They were legal
technicians-scriveners-not professionals with a broad responsibility.
They claim, therefore, that the legal advice they gave was proper under
the circumstances and that all the wrongdoing is attributable to other
actors. At the same time, those other actors-the company's officers and
directors and the outside accountants-are claiming that they also had
limited knowledge and relied on the legal advice of the lawyers. The
"circle of blame" that results is a classic (and generally unsuccessful)
attempt at avoidance of responsibility, since each provides evidence
against the others. More broadly, lawyers cannot absolve themselves
from legal responsibility by pretending that only business or accounting
decisions are involved, just as managers and accountants cannot avoid
responsibility by claiming that they relied on lawyers. If a series of
transactions has no substantial business purpose (i.e., no property or risk
is transferred to a third party) and the facts and circumstances suggest
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that their sole function is to give the company's balance sheet a false
boost, legal questions are raised that are not resolved by an accountant's
approval.
Some years ago, Louis Brandeis was being questioned by a Senate
committee about the generality and vagueness of the Sherman Act.
Businessmen argued that the law was unfair because its boundaries were
not clear. Brandeis replied to them as follows:
[Y]our lawyers... can tell you where a fairly safe course lies. If you
are walking along a precipice no human being can tell you how near
you can go... because you may stumble on a loose stone .... slip and
go over; but anybody can tell you where you can walk perfectly safe
within convenient distance of that precipice. The difficulty which men
have felt ... has been rather that they have 46wanted to go the limit
rather than that they have wanted to go safely.
That is great advice from a great man!
QUESTION AND ANSWER

PROFESSOR FREEDMAN: My first observation is that having
heard Roger's rebuttal, which I do appreciate, Roger who has been
paying attention anyway up to a point. I hope having heard the rebuttal,
you will read the argument. One place it appears is in Understanding
Lawyers' Ethics at 147 to 151, 47 but I happen to have by chance in my
office some reprints, and I'll leave a stack out, and you can pick them
up. In some respect, Roger's defense of Rule 1.13 is a rather strange, and
I think self-defeating one. First, he says that it is ambiguous. It is subject
to the kind of reading that I give it or at least to a reading different from
his own. He acknowledges that it makes repeated references to the
lawyer restricting her conduct to the best interest of the corporation. He
acknowledges that no place in 1.13 does it ever mention concern for the
interest of third parties, which is what the fraud provisions in 1.6 are all
about. And then he says, in effect, if I understand him, that it's
superfluous anyway, because you got 1.6, you got 4.1, you got 4.4, you
got the lawyer's obligation to her client, which is the entity. So the
lawyer doesn't need the instructions from 1.13 to go up the ladder to the
board of directors, which is ordinarily understood to be the embodiment
of the entity. If we don't need it, if it's ambiguous, and if it can be read
46. HARRY FIRST, BUSINESS CRIME: CASES AND MATERIALS 27 (1990) (quoting Louis D.
Brandeis, Hearings before the S. Comm on Interstate Commerce on S. 98, 62nd Cong. 1161 (1911)).
47. MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 147-51 (3d
ed. 2004).
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as contradicting all of these other rules in the corporate context, let's just
get rid of it.
I remember my first objection back in 1983 to the earlier version of
1.13, which did the same thing virtually. They've only typed it up and
made it more favorable to the corporation in this fraud on the public in
making them think that we have a real reporting up and reporting out
provision. I was debating with Geoff Hazard, and Geoff said, "Monroe,
all of this is irrelevant, all 1.13 does is to establish that the corporate
client is the entity, the corporation is the client of the lawyer of the
corporation." I said, "Geoff, we can rewrite that about that law. We
don't need this whole provision with all of this language about making
sure you do nothing that's inconsistent with the best interest of the
corporation." And Roger has changed the hypothetical that I gave. He
left totally ambiguous the key element in my hypothetical, and he
presented it to people who drafted it. I'd be interested to know on the
hypothetical that I give what the result is.
My view of 1.13 is that it does require the lawyer to go up, it does
require the lawyer to report out in one circumstance only, and that is
when the information is going to get out anyway. If it's likely to get out
anyway then the lawyer can go up and can go out, but if the lawyer
makes the judgment that it is not likely to get out, there's a good chance
these people are going to get away with this forever, then the lawyer is
absolutely forbidden by 1.13, no ambiguity. The express language, the
lawyer is forbidden to report out and to report up. Give that hypothetical,
which is my very simple hypothetical to the people who drafted a
situation where the lawyer makes the judgment, it is not likely that the
corporation is going to get caught in its overseas bribery or its small
frauds on a lot of people that amount to a lot, and ask them what the
result is then, and make sure that they reread what they drafted.
Now, Roger, first of all, my recommendation to the New York
people is that they just leave out 1.13. It contributes nothing to 1.6, 4.1
and other provisions. My recommendation is leave it out, but, Roger, if
you want to sit down with me, we'll redraft this, take out the ambiguity,
put in the interest of third parties, take out the overriding concern for the
welfare of the corporation as the exclusive concern of 1.13. I'll join with
you in doing it.
PROFESSOR CRAMTON: A brief response, then I'll get more
questions and comments from the floor. In agreeing with you on some
problems of the existing drafting, I was concentrating on just making
every word clear and certainly necessary. I think the rule would have
been better if other words were used than those in the rule. I think the
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view is that 1.13 is superfluous and does nothing-I'm astonished that
Geoff Hazard should acknowledge it as an established entity rule.
There's no point in having it. That's part of the regular law anyway, but
why don't you put that in the textbook? Corporate law makes that point.
But you agree with me I guess that in some situations it does require up
the ladder, and in some situations it does require disclosure outside.
What you do is rebuild the concept of substantial injury, from the point
of view that there's some possibility that the frauds on a very large scale
won't be discovered.
Well, a lawyer that makes that judgment in a case in which you can
have whistle blowers, in a case in which there is a lot of information
sources, and people follow the listed public company closely, and the
shareholders do, the information has a way of getting out. It's hard to
cover up chicanery over a long, long period. So lawyers ought to assume
their clients, their corporations want to stay within the bounds of law,
whereas you just assume that they want to violate the law, and because
they can make more money by violating the law, lawyers kind of
unknowingly or even willingly assist them in doing that, and I just resist
that notion. I think corporations want to comply with the law, and their
counsel staff inside and outside try to assist them to that end. When they
take that advice to the board about what is lawful and what is unlawful
and so on, even in an ambiguous situation, where they get the advice, but
the lawyer said: "Well, it's maybe okay but there are serious legal
problems, there will probably be litigation and so on," many
businessmen are very reluctant to go ahead. So I just think that your
world is too much influenced by preconceptions that corporations want
to violate the law, the lawyers they hire don't care if they do, and kind of
assist them in doing that, and that the law and legal system regulators do
nothing about it, and are totally uninterested in the problem.
PROFESSOR NEEDHAM: Hi. I'm Carol Needham, St. Louis
University. I have to respectfully weigh in that I disagree with Monroe. I
agree with Roger on this point, that it cannot turn on the likelihood of
discovery. The likelihood of discovery absolutely cannot be the linchpin,
but I have to disagree with Roger-I'm really setting myself up for
attack here taking on both-that you have to think about the background
against which you're asking lawyers to act, and when you were talking
about there being no discipline against 'lawyers that go up the ladder, I
agree. There really is no record of such, but think about the position of
in-house counsel. In many jurisdictions there is no cause of action for
retaliatory discharge. There is no protection under whistle blowers
statutes. Even statutes that on their face are written explicitly to protect a
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person who discovers various kinds of harm, which is precisely the harm
discovered by this particular in-house counsel. That counsel is not
protected, because they have to keep the confidentiality as the attorney.
Essentially, I think the key is the language in Rule 1.6, to the extent that
that determines the extent of the protection under the duty of
confidentiality of the information of the client, when you take out even
the generally known phrase in the current language of the model rules,
and you take out the other law. I mean that doesn't vitiate it, but even as
it stands, even if you plug it back in generally known, and some states
have taken out other law and plugged that back in, you still don't have
an adequate opening exception to the rule of confidentiality for in-house
counsel to allow them to make the revelation that you would like to see
made. So my question to you is, what language would you like to see in
Rule 1.6 that would permit disclosure in the circumstances?
PROFESSOR CRAMTON: Well, first, what the SEC includes in its
rules is protection against retaliation against whistle blowers, and some
states have whistle blowers statutes that do the same thing, and some of
them have been interpreted as applying to lawyers, and that can be
expanded. More states can provide for remedies for in-house counsel
and in some situations for outside counsel, well, that's a very different
problem. They don't have the vulnerability and they can withdraw, but
you're right, inside counsel cannot withdraw without resigning their
lawyer and looking for another job, but you made very good comments,
and law reform efforts in this area are needed, and I'm delighted to
collaborate with more people who want to make useful improvements in
the law.
MR. SHIRLEY: Evan Shirley from Honolulu, Hawaii. This is more
in the nature of a comment than a question. The language that Rule 1.13
turns on that we're all discussing is there's likely to result in substantial
injury to the organization, the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably
necessary in the best interest of the organization. It's important I think in
fraud cases to point out there is no statute of limitations for fraud. That
many jurisdictions look at it as the longest period of statute of
limitations from the time of discovery of the fraud, so that a lawyer may
look at the situation that is occurring now in 2005, and it may not be
discovered for four or five years from now. Yet the corporation, the
interests of the organization will be substantially harmed four or five
years from now with no statute of limitations, another six year statute, or
five year statute. And I think Monroe acknowledges that when he said
it's likely to get away with it forever, and I think there's an interesting
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case, it's Yellow Cab Co. 4 8 It comes from the California Supreme Court.
What Yellow Cab did was systematically set their meters ahead by about
one-half of one percent, and it took a map maker to the airport from
downtown Los Angeles to LA International. And he kept going to the
airport on a number of occasions, and he would ask the cab driver to
follow a precise route, and he'd go back and he calculated it again, and
he realized that each time he was being charged .005 more than what the
fare should be, which resulted in a rather substantial, I think it was like
an $11 million judgment against the Yellow Cab Company. That had to
be paid out of corporate profits, not as an expense. It was specifically
ordered that way. They couldn't deduct the fraud, so you never really
know what circumstances are going to occur. I'm sure that Yellow Cab
Company never anticipated having a map maker discover such a fraud.
But my point mainly was that statute of limitations point that it just
continues, and the person who's committing the fraud can't say: "You
should have filed the action earlier, because we covered it up
substantially." That's all.
PROFESSOR SIMON: Just a quick comment to bring that closer to
home. Many people have been reading about the theft of $11.4 million
from the Roslyn School District. How was this discovered? Was it
discovered through the independent auditors who vigilantly checked or
were supposed to check everything? No, it was discovered when a Home
Depot clerk called the school district and said: "You know, are people
allowed to buy stuff for themselves and their personal home
improvements on a school credit card?"
MS. STRETCH: Becky Stretch from the ABA. I think Monroe is
totally correct about this and I really wish they had written it differently,
but I still believe that Monroe's paper doesn't acknowledge that 1.13(c)
is in addition to 1.6(b), and Monroe is correct that it could be a whole lot
clearer than that is the case-but comment six to Rule 1.13 is about
relations to other rules, and it does say that paragraph (c) of this rule
supplements Rule 1.6(b) by providing an additional basis upon which
the lawyer may reveal information. So I think the significant thing about
1.13, even though it could have been written a whole lot better and it's
probably too protective in that sense, is an additional disclosure option
for the lawyer of a corporation even though his services were not used.
Under 1.6, the disclosure is only if the lawyer services were used, so
under 1.13, the lawyer may disclose even though his services were not
used, under the limited circumstances described in 1.13. And, yes, it's
48. Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 433 P.2d 732, 736-37 (Cal. 1967).
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probably not written beautifully, and we could certainly do a better job
and some people did suggest better language, but we also move
differently in different places, but I know we probably have to move
on-I hope I've explained that.
PROFESSOR CRAMTON: It's very helpful.
PROFESSOR FREEDMAN: That's also answered in my article. I
won't go into how.
PROFESSOR SIMON: We have to move on to the next speaker,
but I'm glad that this has generated such a lively discussion. I thank
Roger Cramton very much for a provocative and interesting address.
[Applause]
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